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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS-FEDERAL COURT RE-
VIEW OF STATE STATUTES-ABSTENTION-The United States Supreme
Court has held that the abstention doctrine bars a federal court
from entertaining a civil rights action seeking injunctive relief
against an ongoing state civil contempt proceeding, allegedly de-
priving petitioners of due process, where petitioners have an ade-
quate opportunity to present their federal claims in the state pro-
ceeding.
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
In January, 1974, the Public Loan Company of Poughkeepsie,
New York, obtained a default judgment in a New York state court
against Harry Vail, Jr., who had breached a loan contract with that
company.' Three months later, the judgment remained unsatisfied,
and Vail was subpoenaed to attend a deposition to be held in May,
1974 to give information concerning his financial affairs. 2 Vail failed
to appear for the deposition, and Judge Joseph Juidice of the Dutch-
ess County Court issued an order 3 directing Vail to appear before
him in August, 1974 to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.
On the date scheduled for the hearing, Vail again failed to appear,
and Judge Juidice issued a contempt order requiring Vail to pay a
fine to the creditor.4 One month later, the fine had not been paid,
1. The action was filed in the City Court of Poughkeepsie, N.Y., and the default judgment
rendered against Vail, a Poughkeepsie resident, was in the amount of $534.36. Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327, 329 (1977).
2. Id. The subpoena was issued pursuant to provisions of N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & R. §§
5223, 5224 by the creditor's attorney. These provisions authorized the creditor's attorney to
take an oral deposition of the judgment debtor or compel him to answer written interrogato-
ries, in order to discover assets which could be used to satisfy the judgment.
3. This "show cause" order was authorized by § 757 of the New York Judiciary Law, N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 757(1) (McKinney 1975), which also authorized the lower court judge to order the
defendant to be arrested and immediately brought before him for the "show cause" hearing.
The order did not warn Vail that failure to appear at the hearing could result in fines and/or
eventual imprisonment, nor did the statute require such a warning. The text of this statute,
and the other relevant sections of the Judiciary Law, is set forth in full in Vail v. Quinlan,
406 F. Supp. 951, 953-55 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977).
4. The judge is required to impose a fine upon a finding that a person has refused to obey
an order of court or subpoena imposed for the benefit of another party to the suit. N.Y. JUD.
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and the creditor obtained an ex parte commitment order for Vail's
arrest and confinement.5
Vail was released the day after his arrest' upon payment of the
fine and costs.' Subsequently, he and several other similarly situ-
ated judgment debtors brought a class action' in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, "section 1983,"1 seeking to enjoin the continued
use of the contempt provisions of the New York Judiciary Law. 0
LAW § 770 (McKinney 1975). This is the classic form of punishment for civil, as opposed to
criminal, contempt. Criminal contempts are acts done in disrespect of the court or its process,
punishable by fines or imprisonment. Civil contempts are failures to obey orders of a court
imposed for the benefit or advantage of another party to the. proceeding. As it is an offense
against that party and not against the dignity of the court, a civil contempt is normally
punishable by fine, imposed for the indemnity of the aggrieved party. BLACK'S LAW DIMsON-
ARY 390 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The section of the statute under which Judge Juidice imposed
his contempt order should not be confused with a separate provision which authorized the
judge to order imprisonment if the creditor filed an affidavit within 30 days of the civil con-
tempt order, stating the fine was still unsatisfied. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 756 (McKinney
1975) and text accompanying note 5 infra.
5. This procedure was expressly authorized. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 756 (McKinney 1975). Its
operation more closely resembles criminal contempt, since the judge is permitted to issue an
arrest warrant and imprison the offender upon his failure to pay. Vail was first held in civil
contempt and fined. Upon failure to pay that fine, he was ordered imprisoned, a punishment
usually associated with criminal contempt. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
6. 406 F. Supp. at 957. At the time of his arrest, Vail and his family were on public
assistance and had only $1.00 to live on until his next welfare check. He and his family owned
no property except household furniture and clothing. Id.
7. Vail was released when a relative paid the fine of $270.00 plus costs. The fine was
advanced to the creditor as partial satisfaction of the debt. 430 U.S. at 329 n.4.
8. Certification of the class, consisting of all persons who had been or were at the time
subject to civil contempt proceedings under the New York Judiciary Law, was made by
District Court Judge McMahon at the outset of the litigation. 406 F. Supp. at 953 n.1.
9. The statute, originally enacted by Congress as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22,
§ 1, 17 Stat. 13, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute. . . of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 1983 or Civil Rights Act].
10. Vail and his co-plaintiffs contended that the New York procedures deprived them of
procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
because no notice of the possibility of incarceration was provided the debtor in the show cause
order, because the procedures did not require a hearing with the debtor present prior to a
finding of contempt and incarceration, and because the procedures did not provide for the
right to counsel. 430 U.S. at 340 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). Section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment, enacted in 1868, [hereinafter cited as due process clause] reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
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The plaintiffs also sought damages against the individual
government-employee defendants." The three-judge district court,"
convened to consider the case, held that certain provisions of New
York's civil contempt statutes violated the due process clause and
enjoined their enforcement."
The case was appealed14 by the defendant judges; the Supreme
Court reversed without reaching the merits of the section 1983
claim, deciding that the lower court should not have heard the case.
After dismissing the complaint as to all but two of the plaintiffs for
lack of standing,"' the Court held that the doctrine of abstention
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. At no point in the state proceedings had Vail appeared to
contest the action on the merits or raise these constitutional issues. 430 U.S. at 330.
11. 406 F. Supp. at 953. Judges Juidice and Aldrich of the Dutchess County Court and
Sheriff Quinlan, the arresting officer, were named as party defendants. The lower court held
that the doctrine of judicial immunity barred recovery against the judges and also dismissed
the damage claims against Quinlan due to the lack of any allegations of malice or bad faith
on his part. 406 F. Supp. at 956 n.3. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). For a
discussion of the requirements of a successful damage actioh under § 1983, see Comment,
Section 1983 and The New Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15
DuQ. L. REv. 49, 64-67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The New Supreme Court].
12. At the time this action was filed, three-judge federal district courts were required by
statute to hear any action to enjoin a state statute on grounds that it violated the United
States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)(repealed 1976). In 1976, Congress abrogated this
provision by the Act of August 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, expressly making
the repeal prospective in operation. Id. § 7. Congress also amended 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970),
which had mandated three-judge federal courts to hear challenges to federal statutes. This
provision now requires that three-judge courts also hear challenges to state apportionment of
congressional and statewide legislative districts. Act of August 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94-381, § 4,
90 Stat. 1119 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970)).
13. The district court struck down N.Y. Jun. LAW §§ 756, 757, 770, 772, 773, 774, & 775
(McKinney 1975)(concerning activities giving rise to contempt), leaving four provisions, N.Y.
JUD. LAW § § 765, 767, 769, & 771 (McKinney 1975)(governing activities of sheriffs and pre-
scribing certain discovery procedures) unaffected by its order. 406 F. Supp. at 955-56.
14. Direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court from any order of a three-judge
district court is a matter of right. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
15. Plaintiffs Patrick Ward and Joseph Rabasco were the only two parties the Court found
to have standing or an active, justiciable "case or controversy" under Article III of the
Constitution. At the time the complaint was filed in the district court, all the plaintiffs,
except Ward and Rabasco, had already been imprisoned, paid their court-imposed fines, and
had been released. Ward had not been imprisoned, but alleged that he was in imminent
danger of a contempt order. Rabasco had been imprisoned and paid his fine, but, like Vail
and several others, the fine had been insufficient to meet the amount of the judgment against
him in the state court proceeding. Of those who paid the fine, the Court found that only
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enunciated in Younger v. Harris6 and elaborated in Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd. 7 barred a federal court from intervening in an on-
going state civil contempt proceeding where the plaintiff had an
opportunity to make the substance of his alleged section 1983 claim
in the state court.18
The Younger abstention doctrine required a federal court to dis-
miss absolutely a case when a state criminal proceeding involving
the same parties or issues was pending.'9 Huffman expanded the
doctrine by applying it to cases where the pending state action was
a civil nuisance proceeding. 0 The district court had applied the
Younger-Huffman language literally and determined that, because
Juidice involved neither type of proceeding, abstention was not re-
quired .21
Rejecting an analysis based solely on the nature of the proceeding
to be enjoined, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, instead
focused on the underlying policy foundation for the abstention doc-
trine: the notions of federalism and comity inherent in the American
scheme of governmental powers .2  Federalism is the belief in mu-
Rabasco had standing, since he alone had alleged the threat of future contempt orders and
imprisonment. 430 U.S. at 332-33.
16. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal court forbidden to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecu-
tion).
17. 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (federal court must abstain from interfering with ongoing state
civil nuisance proceedings).
18. 430 U.S. at 333-35. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by
Justices Powell, Blackmun, White and Chief Justice Burger. Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stewart dissented.
19. The Court's holding in Younger, that a federal court must abstain when there is an
ongoing criminal proceeding, was qualified by three exceptions: when the federal plaintiff
could show "great and immediate" irreparable harm to a federal constitutional right, 401 U.S.
at 46; when the statute upon which the prosecution is based was shown to be flagrantly and
patently violative of an express constitutional provision, id. at 53; or when there was evidence
that the prosecution was brought in bad faith or with an intention to harass, id. at 54.
20. In Huffman, a successor to the leasehold interest of a theater, closed for displaying
pornographic films by a decree in a state court proceeding under an Ohio public nuisance
statute, brought a successful § 1983 action in federal district court, enjoining enforcement of
the Ohio decree insofar as it closed the theater to films not having been judged obscene in a
prior adversary proceeding. 420 U.S. at 598-99. Since the state was a party to the state
proceeding, and the proceeding was said to be "in aid of and closely related to" criminal
statutes prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials, the Court held that the federal
court should have abstained, calling the nuisance proceedings "more akin" to criminal prose-
cutions. Id. at 604.
21. 406 F. Supp. at 957-59.
22. 430 U.S. 334. Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice Black's language from Younger which
defined the terms federalism and comity synonymously as:
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tually strong, independent federal and state governments, and com-
ity involves a recognition that state courts are as competent as
federal courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims, mani-
fested by federal non-intervention in pending state proceedings.
23
The Court found that a state has a vital interest in its contempt
process, an interest which would be infringed upon by federal inter-
vention."4 The majority thus held that the Younger abstention doc-
trine was applicable to cases where the pending state action be-
tween private individuals results in civil contempt proceedings.
25
A state's interest in its contempt proceedings, the Court con-
ceded, was not as great as its interests in the enforcement of its
criminal laws or the maintenance of quasi-criminal proceedings .2
Nevertheless, in the majority's view, whether contempt proceedings
were labeled civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal, interference with
them was an offense to the state every bit as great as intervention
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free
to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
401 U.S. at 44. Early Supreme Court decisions indicated that the doctrine of comity was
based on the respect state and federal sovereignties owed one another in cases involving
concurrent jurisdiction; deference was to be given to the court first invoked. The doctrine was
modified in 1875 when Congress passed the statute conferring general jurisdiction to the
federal courts in all cases involving a constitutional question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Subse-
quently, the trend was to uphold federal court intervention, producing widespread public
antagonism in the states. See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REv.
345, 359-66 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Warren]. In the mid-1920's, the Supreme Court
began restricting the federal courts' power to interfere with ongoing state proceedings. See,
e.g., Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926) (extraordinary circumstances required to justify
federal injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions). Since that time, the "proper
respect" underlying comity has come to be associated most often with the concept of federal
non-intervention in state proceedings. Warren, supra at 359-66.
23. 430 U.S. at 334.
24. Id. See also text accompanying notes 28-29 infra.
25. 430 U.S. at 335. The Court thus applied abstention, for the first time, in a non-
criminal or quasi-criminal setting, extending Younger and Huffman beyond the narrow fac-
tual confines of those cases. See notes 16, 17, 19, & 20 and accompanying text supra. The
majority also pointed out that the abstention doctrine is wholly independent of the federal
anti-injunction act which bars federal courts from interfering with pending state proceedings.
430 U.S. at 335 n.ll. The anti-injunction law provides: "A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), § 1983
actions for injunctive relief were held to come within the above exception for actions
"expressly authorized" by Act of Congress. See notes 40 & 77 and accompanying text infra.
26. 430 U.S. at 335.
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in a criminal prosecution,2 as the Court viewed the contempt power
as the heart of effective enforcement of the state's judicial system.28
Additionally, failing to abstain in cases challenging state contempt
actions might negatively reflect upon the state court's competence
to enforce federal constitutional rights, a classic concern of federal-
ism. 29 The Court, however, refused to consider the applicability of
Younger abstention to all civil litigation.30
The Court distinguished the decision in Gerstein v. Pugh,3' upon
which the district court had primarily relied. The majority reasoned
that in Gerstein, the federal plaintiffs had sought to enjoin an un-
constitutional pre-trial detention, the legality of which could not be
raised as a defense in the underlying state criminal prosecution.32
The injunction sought in Juidice, however, consisted of a challenge
the Court felt could be made in the state contempt proceeding.3
Allowing federal intervention on the authority of Gerstein, there-
fore, would be unwarranted.
Although Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, he disa-
greed with the majority on the application of Younger abstention to
the facts of Juidice.34 He argued that the exception recognized in
Younger, allowing a federal court to intervene whenever the federal
27. Id. at 335-36. Justice Rehnquist observed that, while contempt procedures do help
secure the private interests of competing parties to lawsuits, they also bolster the authority
of the judicial system, "so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory." Id. at
336 n.12.
28. Id. at 336.
29. Id. See also note 22 and accompanying text supra.
30. 430 U.S. at 336 n.13. See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
31. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Gerstein, several Florida prisoners brought a class action under
§ 1983 to enjoin state statutory procedures whereby a person could be detained for trial
following his arrest without a hearing to contest the issue of probable cause. On the abstention
issue, the Court ruled that since the legality of the pre-trial detention could not be raised as
a defense to the prosecution itself, the injunction was not directed to the prosecution as such,
but at the pre-trial detention, and thus Younger was inapplicable. Id. at 108 n.9.
32. 430 U.S. at 336-37.
33. Id. at 337 n.14. The Court felt that the debtor-plaintiffs could have presented their
federal claims at the hearing on the order to show cause. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
The Court stated that even had the contempt order issued, a motion to vacate it or stay the
state proceedings and, ultimately, review as of right in the Supreme Court were available.
430 U.S. at 337 n.14.
34. 430 U.S. at 339. Justice Stevens did not express his views on the majority's extension
of Younger abstention to the type of civil proceedings presented in Juidice, and it is not
exactly clear from his opinion that he necessarily disagreed with this aspect of the case. His
discussion of the inappropriateness of Younger abstention in Juidice was based on his feeling
that one of the Younger exceptions was applicable. He thus implicitly approved of the major-
ity's rejection of an analysis based solely on the type of proceeding involved.
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plaintiff has suffered or risks great and immediate irreparable harm
to a federal constitutional right, was applicable. 5 Since the plaintiff
would suffer irreparable harm if his allegations of due process in-
firmities in the statute proved constitutionally sound, the Court,
Stevens said, had an obligation to reach the merits of the case." He
concluded, however, that the New York procedures provided the
judgment debtors with adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard,37 and therefore denied section 1983 relief.
The first dissent, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Jus-
35. Id. at 340 n.3. Justice Stevens reasoned that if, as plaintiffs claimed, they had a
constitutional right to a hearing before incarceration, and the New York procedures presented
the possibility that one could be imprisoned without having been given an opportunity for
such a hearing, the harm complained of (incarceration) could occur before the constitution-
ally required hearing, and thus the Younger exception was appropriate. His analysis closely
resembled that advanced by the Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). See note 31
and accompanying text supra. His conclusion was bottomed on his view that the basic
premise underlying Younger was that a federal court may act when the plaintiff has an
inadequate remedy at law. 430 U.S. at 339. Since the Younger exception required a showing
of "great and immediate" irreparable harm, Justice Stevens may appear to have understated
the prerequisite necessary to invoke this exception to abstention. Implicit in his opinion,
however, was the inclusion of a requirement of an imminent injury to a federal constitutional
right (not irreparable harm or an inadequate remedy at law in the normal equity sense of
the words) in that he refers to the "alleged federal wrong." Id. at 341. Justice Black in
Younger explained it as follows:
In all of these cases the Court stressed the importance of showing irreparable injury,
the traditional prerequisite to obtaining an injunction. In addition, however, the Court
also made clear that in view of the fundamental policy against federal interference with
state criminal prosecutions, even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is "both
great and immediate." . . . Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety,
and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not
by themselves be considered "irreparable" in the special legal sense of that term.
Instead, the threat to the plaintiffs federally protected rights must be one that cannot
be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.
401 U.S. at 46 (citations omitted). The Younger Court also classified threats and harassment
by law enforcement officials as constituting a type of irreparable harm in the sense envisioned
above. Id. at 47-48. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (federal injunctive relief
permissible when federal plaintiff alleged threats to prosecute under a statute allegedly overly
broad on first amendment grounds).36. 430 U.S. at 341. Justice Stevens further supported his decision to reach the merits by
observing that, to decide whether or not to abstain in the face of a due process claim, the
district court would first have to examine the statutes to see whether a constitutional chal-
lenge could have been made. In effect, the court would resolve the case on the merits before
a decision was made to hear it: obviously an improper, backwards approach to constitutional
adjudication. Id. at 341 n.4.
37. Id. at 341. Justice Stevens found the New York procedures provided for adequate
notice and opportunities to be heard and furthermore, that the right to counsel was not denied
because proof of indigency, a prerequisite to obtaining free counsel, would provide a defense
to the contempt charge.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 16: 95
tice Marshall, 8 lashed out at what was termed another step in the
process of "eviscerating" 9 section 1983. Justice Brennan devoted his
entire opinion to an attack on the majority's decision to ab-
stain-emphasizing that Congress intended the federal judiciary to
play the major role in adjudicating section 1983 claims-and never
specifically addressed the merits of the constitutional challenge."
Justice Stewart also dissented,4 but on the grounds that the
Court had invoked an improper form of abstention. Since he felt
that the New York civil contempt procedures presented interpreta-
tion problems, Stewart opted for the type of abstention first enunci-
ated in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 2 which allows the
federal court to retain jurisdiction while obtaining a clarification of
state law from the state courts. Merely staying the federal action,
he believed, would serve the dual goals of minimizing interference
with state court proceedings while preserving the plaintiff's right to
a federal forum. 3 Moreover, Justice Stewart pointed out that the
38. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 346.
40. Reviewing the legislative history of § 1983, Justice Brennan first argued that the
congressional purpose in passing the Civil Rights Act was to create a supplementary federal
remedy for individuals deprived of rights secured under the Constitution. That purpose would
be unjustifiably frustrated by requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to pursue his federal claims in
pending state proceedings involving private litigants and no strong state interest. Id. at 342.
His second argument was that the Court's extension of Younger abstention into the area of
civil litigation further erodes the Court's holding in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972),
that § 1983 actions for injunctive relief come within the "expressly authorized" exception in
the federal anti-injunction act. See note 25 supra. Continued extensions of judicial abstention
have the effect of barring §1983 actions, just as the statute otherwise would, were it not for
Mitchum. Finally, Justice Brennan noted that extensions of abstention do not promote feder-
alism, but damage it, because the role federal courts play in vindicating rights common to
all citizens of all the states is an important part of federalism, a point neglected in the
majority's opinion. 430 U.S. at 346-47.
41. 430 U.S. at 347.
42. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman, the Texas Railroad Commission had issued an order
requiring a conductor to be in charge of all railroad sleeping cars. On some of its runs in Texas,
the Pullman Company had only one sleeping car, under the charge of porters, all of whom
were black. The Pullman Company sued in federal court to enjoin the order, alleging that it
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's grant of injunctive relief. The question of whether
the commission actually had the power to issue the order had not been addressed by the state
courts. If resolved against the commission, this would have obviated the necessity of the
plaintiff's constitutional challenges. The Court ruled, therefore, that the lower court should
have abstained and remitted the parties to the state courts of Texas, retaining jurisdiction
to hear the constitutional claims, if necessary, after the relevant state statutes were con-
strued. Id. at 501.
43. This is the distinction between Pullman abstention and Younger: Younger mandates
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Court had traditionally preferred to invoke Pullman rather than
Younger abstention when grounds for the former were clear."
The dramatic rise since the early 1960's of the section 1983 rem-
edy from relative obscurity to prominence resulted in a deluge of
civil rights actions in the federal courts 5 and helped trigger the
Burger Court's somewhat understandable concern over the federal
caseload." In Juidice, however, the most recent illustration of the
Court's eagerness to cut back on the caseload47 through the use of
the abstention doctrine, the Court unfortunately exhibited several
serious deficiencies in reasoning.
Assuming arguendo that Younger abstention is appropriate for
civil contempt proceedings, the Juidice Court misapplied the excep-
tion developed in Younger which sanctions federal intervention
when the plaintiff faces great and immediate irreparable harm.48
The plaintiffs in Juidice argued that due process entitled them to a
hearing before incarceration. They alleged that defects in the notice
provisions of the New York statutes prevented them from having an
opportunity to raise this issue, however, before the harm they com-
plained of was suffered." Justice Stevens accurately observed that
the dismissal of the plaintiff's federal action, while Pullman only requires its temporary
suspension. 430 U.S. at 348.
44. Id. at 348, citing Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976), as the most recent pronouncement
of the vitality of Pullman abstention. In Carey, plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action to enjoin
enforcement of New York's prejudgment attachment procedure whereby a state court plain-
tiff could attach, prior to judgment and after proving proper security, debts owed the defen-
dant by third parties. The lower court had granted relief, but on appeal the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded to the lower court with instructions to abstain from a decision on the
federal constitutional issues until the parties had an opportunity to obtain a construction of
the New York law from New York courts. 425 U.S. at 78.
45. See The New Supreme Court, supra note 11, at 49-51 (discussing the effects of the
increase in § 1983 actions on the federal system).
46. See Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts
on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. (ARIz. ST. L.J.)
557, 559-63 [hereinafter cited as Aldisert]. Judge Aldisert is a circuit judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
47. Another primary reason suggested for the Court's present perspective on § 1983, apart
from its concern over the caseload, is to increase respect for the Constitution, which the Court
views as being abused when invoked every time a conceivable liberty or property interest
has allegedly been damaged by a representative of the state. See The New Supreme Court,
supra note 11, at 91. The Court likewise has a legitimate concern, when called upon to
reconcile clashes between sovereignties, in maintaining a healthy balance between respect for
state courts' ability to adjudicate constitutional claims and the federal court role, assigned
to it by Congress, of vindicating rights arising under the federal constitution.
48. See notes 19 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
49. See notes 10 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
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the state "remedies" of appeal and collateral attack, which the
majority viewed as adequate, 0 could not suffice. 5' The Court's dis-
tinction of Gerstein v. Pugh is also difficult to accept," given the
analagous factual situations: the injunction in Juidice was directed
at the constitutional issue of a hearing before incarceration, which,
similar to Gerstein, could not be raised on the merits in the con-
tempt proceeding.
The more significant flaw in the Court's reasoning, however, con-
cerns the basic issue of whether Younger abstention should have
been extended to section 1983 claims seeking to enjoin state civil
contempt proceedings. Incredibly, but perhaps symbolically, the
Court never acknowledged the unavoidable conflict between section
1983 and federalism, the notion underlying the abstention doctrine.
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was to interpose federal
courts between the states and individuals whose rights were alleg-
edly violated by those states, 3 and friction between the federal gov-
ernment and the states is thus both inevitable 4 and necessary.
When state officials, under color of state law, act to deprive persons
of their fundamental federal rights, federal action is necessary if the
congressional purpose is to be fulfilled. By expanding the scope of
the abstention doctrine5 1 in Juidice, however, the Court placed a
premium on the importance of state's rights" while all but ignoring
the likewise compelling case for preserving individual remedies aris-
50. 430 U.S. at 340 n.3. See also notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
51. 430 U.S. at 340-41.
52. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
53. 430 U.S. at 339-40 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also note 35 and accompanying
text supra.
54. For a review of various classic confrontations between federal and state courts, see
Warren, supra note 22, at 347-66.
55. Some judicial and statutory checks on the flood of § 1983 litigation in the federal
courts are necessary both on practical and constitutional grounds, since much of the litigation
involves trivial constitutional deprivations. See Aldisert, supra note 46, at 569-71.
56. Justice Black, writing for the majority in Younger, even conceded that federalism
includes not only the concept of states' rights, but also necessary federal intervention at
times. He noted that the concept:
does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centraliza-
tion of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts.
The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
401 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added).
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ing under the Civil Rights Act.57
Furthermore, the decision is an unwarranted extension of the ab-
stention doctrine in an area where the importance of the state inter-
est is seriously challenged, if not completely overridden, by the
individual's interest in securing his federal rights in a federal forum.
"Notions of comity and federalism" can hardly justify such a rule
of law. Prior to this extension of Younger abstention, state interests
were more than adequately protected and thus comity was suffi-
ciently furthered. First, Younger mandated abstention in the face
of pending state criminal prosecutions and the propriety of this rule
has never been seriously disputed." Undeniably, the state has an
interest in the prosecution of crimes against it. Furthermore, even
in the absence of an extension of Younger, federal courts could
exercise Pullman abstention, remitting the questions of ambiguous
state law to the state courts for possible limiting constructions,
where appropriate.59 Finally, the federal anti-injunction act 0 was,
and still is, generally applicable to all other federal equity and dam-
age actions. States' rights, far from being threatened prior to
57. Prior to the War Between the States, Congress relied on the state courts to vindicate
essential rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws, with review as of right in the
Supreme Court from decisions denying constitutional challenges to state laws being the only
exception. After the Civil War, however, with the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, nationalism dominated political
thought. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1967). Congress' investiture of general
federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts in 1875 also was significant in expanding
federal power. Thereafter, the federal courts "ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealings
between citizens of different states, and became the primary and powerful reliances for
vindicating every right given by the constitution, the laws, and treaties of the U.S." Id. at
247 (emphasis in original). Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974)(emphasizing
that Congress had assigned the federal courts a major responsibility in protecting federal
rights).
58. Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter in Younger. 401 U.S. at 58. See also Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 345. (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing the paramount state
interest in the prosecution of crimes).
59. The Juidice majority did not consider Pullman applicable. This seems to be the better
view, despite Justice Stewart's ideas to the contrary. The rule has been reiterated since
Pullman that "if the state statute in question, although never interpreted by a state tri-
bunal, is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substan-
tially modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the federal court to exercise
its properly invoked jurisdiction." Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965) (§ 1983
action to enjoin Virginia poll tax statute upheld). The statutes in Juidice do not seem to
present the ambiguity necessary and do not seem fairly subject to an interpretation which
would render the constitutional question moot.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See notes 25 & 40 supra.
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Juidice, were enjoying a robust vitality that will doubtless last in-
definitely.
Lower federal courts are likely to assume that abstention with
respect to all pending state court proceedings has become manda-
tory as a result of Juidice,6" with discretion existing only to the
extent of the three exceptions enumerated in Younger.6" Allowing a
federal court faced with pending state civil proceedings broader
discretion to abstain would enable it to weigh all relevant factors;
such a balancing of interests is implicit in the concept of federalism
itself. These factors might include the significance of the state inter-
est involved (which would vary depending on the type of civil pro-
ceeding in question), the gravity of harm alleged by the plaintiff,
and the likelihood of serving or detracting from the notion of federal-
ism." At the same time, necessary limits could be easily placed on
that discretion.6 4
61. Justice Rehnquist noted in Juidice that the express exceptions to abstention enunci-
ated in Younger have survived Juidice, since Juidice represented an extension of Younger to
other proceedings. 430 U.S. at 33. If a federal plaintiff can show that pending state pro-
ceedings, civil or criminal, have been brought in bad faith, or with an intention to harass, or
under statutes clearly and palpably unconstitutional, the federal court need not abstain. See
note 19 and accompanying text supra. These exceptions, however, do not vest much discre-
tion in the federal judge, since the general rule is that abstention must be invoked absent
one of the extremely rigid and narrow exceptions.
62. See note 19 and accompanying text, & note 61 supra.
63. Justice Brennan stated incisively in Juidice that it may indeed be counter to the state
interest if the question of resolving the constitutionality of state statutes in litigation in the
state courts is placed in private parties. He pointed out:
If the State may not be heard in the state civil case, defense of the constitutionality
of its statute would be solely in the hands of a party having neither the State's re-
sources, expertise, nor governmental interest in sustaining the validity of the statute.
A dilemma would be posed even for officials of a State, like New York, having proce-
dures that permit .,. .and in some cases require ... state intervention in suits raising
constitutional challenges to state statutes. They must choose whether to intervene in
countless private lawsuits brought all over the State implicating the constitutionality
of state statutes, or not to intervene and risk adverse decisions having effects far
beyond the interests of the particular private parties. By contrast, a § 1983 suit in
federal court necessarily names the State or its officials as defendants, and the litiga-
tion focuses squarely on the issue of the validity of the statute, with the State defend-
ing its own interest directly.
430 U.S. at 345-46.
64. For example, federal court intervention could be made mandatory when a state civil
proceeding is in progress and there exists, by analogy to the exceptions in Younger, either a
danger of great and irreparable harm to the federal plaintiff, the presence of a statute ex-
pressly violative of constitutional provisions, or evidence that the case was brought in bad
faith. Where none of these factors is present, the trial judge could be given discretion to
determine the question, with his decision being unreviewable save for manifest abuse of
discretion. This, perhaps, would work the necessary cut-back on the federal caseload, which
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Applying this balancing test to the facts in Juidice, abstention
was improper. The state's interest in its contempt process certainly
does not override an individual's right to avoid imprisonment with-
out due process of law. Whether or not the New York procedures in
fact violated the petitioners' due process rights should have been
addressed on the merits in a federal forum.
The Court's decision in Juidice, standing alone, may not appear
to significantly affect the ability of an individual to assert federal
constitutional rights in a federal forum. Yet despite the Court's
caveat that Younger would not thereafter be necessarily applicable
to all civil litigation,"5 the opinion leaves little doubt that the Court
is only waiting for the proper case to make this pronouncement. 6
The majority's finding of a state interest in the civil contempt pro-
cess, 6 7 a contest between private litigants in which the state is not
a party, makes it difficult to imagine how the Court could now fail
to find a state interest in any state civil proceeding. 8
When combined with the Court's other decisions on section 1983
actions, 9 Juidice represents yet another powerful barrier to a poten-
is the Burger Court's major concern. For an analagous proposal concerning Pullman absten-
tion, see Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEx. L. REv. 815, 824-27 (1959).
See also text accompanying note 63 supra.
65. 430 U.S. 336 n.13. See also text accompanying note 26 supra.
66. At the outset of its analysis of Younger, the Juidice Court stated, "We now hold,
however, that the principles of Younger and Huffman are not confined solely to the types of
state actions which were sought to be enjoined in those cases." 430 U.S. at 334. This repre-
sents the first instance where the Court, in developing abstention, explicitly stated that the
presence of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding is not a prerequisite. In addition, the
Court, in setting forth the necessary forum which must be available to the federal plaintiff
in the state proceeding, stated, "Here it is abundantly clear that appellees had an opportunity
to present their federal claims in the state proceeding. No more is required to invoke Younger
abstention." Id. at 337 (emphasis in original). Finally, the Court reiterated that a key factor
in federal court interference is that it reflects negatively on the state courts' ability to enforce
constitutional principles. Id. at 336. By its focus on the respect to be accorded courts of a
state, the Court seems to have implicitly disregarded any concern with the type of proceeding
involved.
67. Id. at 335. See also text accompanying notes 24 & 29 supra.
68. Justice Brennan observed that the Court's focus on the state contempt power was only
a cover "for the ultimate goal of denying § 1983 plaintiffs the federal forum in any case, civil
or criminal, when a pending state proceeding may hear the federal plaintiffs federal claims."
430 U.S. at 344-45 (footnote omitted). Clearly, a state interest exists in civil litigation involv-
ing private parties-offering its citizens their day in court to vindicate private remedies.
Whether such an interest should ever be viewed as significant enough to override a U.S.
citizen's right to a federal forum to hear constitutional claims is another question. See notes
40 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
69. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (injunction issued in § 1983 class action
alleging pervasive pattern of police mistreatment held an unwarranted federal instrusion);
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tial civil rights litigant. Section 1983 plaintiffs may now be forced
to present substantial constitutional claims in pending state pro-
ceedings, where the judges generally are less experienced at han-
dling constitutional claims and obligated, by the separation of pow-
ers doctrine, unlike federal judges reviewing state statutes, to give
maximum deference to state statutes. 0 The decision thus effectively
foreshadows the elimination of a section 1983 cause of action in the
face of any pending state proceeding, and renders the decision in
Mitchum v. Foster,7 where section 1983 claims were held to be
excepted from the federal anti-injunction act, of little future vital-
ity.
Robert J Marino
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) § 1983 damage action alleging defamation by local police
failed to state a cause of action); O'Shea v. Littleton, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (request for § 1983
injunctive relief alleging past acts of racial discrimination held not to constitute an existing
case or controversy); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 322 (1975) (lower court should abstain when
state criminal prosecution is begun after the federal complaint but before any proceedings
on the merits); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, (1976) (federal habeas relief not mandated if
state prisoner had full opportunity to litigate fourth amendment claim in the state prosecu-
tion). For an excellent discussion of the effect of these decisions on the potential § 1983
litigant, see The New Supreme Court, supra note 11, at 91-95.
70. The potential inadequacy of local courts was illuminated by Justice Douglas, dissent-
ing in Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959). The majority in Harrison held that
the Pullman abstention doctrine barred a federal court from enjoining the enforcement of
certain Virginia statutes inhibiting advocacy of racial integration or civil rights by proscribing
in broad terms, barratry, the practice of instigating litigation. Justice Douglas said:
Virginia courts were not parties to the formulation of that legislative program. But they
are interpreters of Virginia laws and bound to construe them, if possible, so that the
legislative purpose is not frustrated. Where state laws make such an assault as these
do on our decisions and a State has spoken defiantly against the constitutional rights
of the citizens, reasons for showing deference to local institutions vanish. The conflict
is plain and apparent; and the federal courts stand as the one authoritative body for
enforcing the constitutional right of the citizens.
Id. at 182.
71. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). See also notes 25 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
